当前位置:网站首页>新闻资讯

我院王强强副教授论文被《European Journal of Operational Research》接受发表

近期,我院王强强副教授以通讯作者身份在期刊《European Journal of Operational Research》(ABS4, IF=5.334)发表了题为《The Informational Role of Guarantee Contracts》的学术论文。该文合作者为中山大学博士生曹一秋。文章摘要信息如下:

 

摘要如下:

Guarantee credit financing (GCF), allows banks to offer loans to capital-constrained retailer (he) based on the guarantee contracts offered by the manufacturer (she). Therefore, this study investigates the signaling role of guarantee contracts when the retailer is less informed about its product's market potential. In particular, we explore a joint contract of guarantee credit and production quantity to deliver the manufacturer's demand information. We add a framework to the capital-constrained supply chain with asymmetric demand information under GCF. Using a signaling game to capture the demand information asymmetry, we identify the strategic interaction between the retailer and the manufacturer under GCF. Also, we investigate the value of GCF when both GCF and trade credit financing (TCF) are viable. We find that the single guarantee contracts cannot signal the manufacturer's demand information when the production cost is less than a threshold, otherwise, only the separating equilibria survive the intuitive criterion. Besides, the findings reveal that the demand information asymmetry can either benefit or harm the retailer or the manufacturer, but cannot benefit both of them. In addition, GCF remains an attractive financing option when both GCF and TCF are viable. A joint contract of guarantee credit and production quantity can be used to deliver the demand information if the guarantee contracts are invalid. Our paper helps to explain the impact of asymmetric demand information on supply chain partners’ decisions under GCF and sheds light on the design and use of guarantee contracts.

 

文章链接:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2021.10.022



0086-411-84710440 office_sba@dufe.edu.cn 辽宁大连沙河口区尖山街217号 微信二维码

辽公网安备21020402000305号

版权所有©2014-2015东北财经大学工商管理学院|邮编:116025